Half an argument, part 2!

Because I am out of time, and feeling lazy now, this is directly lifted from the same Facebook wall of my coworker Sam that the previous post originally appeared on. As such, you'll find that some of my statements either come out of the blue, or are directly addressing the other party. It is late, so I will leave it raw like this.

Enjoy!


I am a big fan of "useful and reasonable" definitions over absolute ones, provided they don't twist the language so far as to redefine it (much). You're right: a system of value is required, and for me this must have some parameters related to some definition or approximate notion of what art is and isn't, so I suppose this element is swinging us back towards that debate.

I would argue somewhat vehemently (as I'm sure you're aware by now) that money is a far cry from objective, when it clearly has a vested interest in promoting media which will produce more money, not which will improve culture or humanity (which I pose as the more powerful motivation for artists producing art, in this comparison).

Part of me is automatically inclined, I must admit, to valuing the opinion or position of researchers and scientists over that of most other folks, as I consider the backing of reproduceable experiment to be a more sound justification for one's position than just about anything. In this sense, I suppose I am conceding the point of a priori proof with regard to distinguishing between fact and opinion. I couldn't give a whit if there's a universal test to distinguish the two on a minute level (unless of course someone were to miraculously produce such a test!).

What I consider a more reasonable and functional distinction is any robust a posteriori proof. As I understand it, the entire science of psychology is rooted in this method, which is why any reasonable research into psychology must be backed with a strong footing in statistics. Without this method of proof, despite being less 'perfect' than all that a priori hullabaloo, we would 'know' a lot less about the human mind; how it works, how it learns, and so on.

What's really neat within this vein is using statistical methods to prove that someone's observational claim cannot be true. This is where the refinement of the field takes place. Scientist (or philosopher) A posits that "something is true" based on having observed something in the real world that seems to be a trend. (Example to follow). Scientist B refines "something is true" by either presenting context-specific cases where it may be found not to be true, or discounts it entirely because it does not account for some data (inconsistent), and so the original idea must be adjusted or added to to account for the extra cases, or rejected in favour of one which more accurately descibes (predicts) real-world events.

Rough example: memory has been (and often still is) considered divided into long term and short term memory "banks." However, this notion has been found inconsistent with the experimental data, as it does not account for memory decay, false memories, and some other stuff, and so has been rejected. The void of how to define our memory processes needed filling, however, so someone suggested that memory is actually more like imagining. This is based in the observation that the same neural pathways fire when looking at an object as when remembering the same object. This has been further refined to separately desribe the operation of perceptual memory (instantaneous availability of information, basically; extremely short), working memory (how much you can keep track of consciously before it gets "rewritten"), and long term memory (pathways strengthened by associations and repeated use). This is, of course, still an imperfect realisation of our memory systems, and as such is constantly being refined by memory scientists, but it provides a more accurate (read: functional) picture of this aspect of our marvellous brainmeats.

Certain aspects of memory research I would consider "facts" (e.g., all human memory is based on the arrangement and interaction of nerve/brain cells), and others the "best available opinion."

A posteriori proofs are a fantastic way to learn about all kinds of aspects of the world. It seems to me that the position fact=opinion completely undermines the validity of all a posteriori proofs, but even a rough observation of the real world reveals the functionality of experimental proofs (which is, of course, itself an a posteriori observation; victory pump for circular reasoning!). In short (haha), I consider the position untenable because although the burden of proof is on those of us who would disagree, said proof is found (in abundance) in clinical observation, which is rejected by your statement in the first place. It sits as its own absolute judgement on the inability to have an absolute judgement about anything, yet is definitively presented as an opinion, and so renders itself a moot point.

Back to art and music. I don't think an unmade bed can be considered art unless it is expressing something of the world or the human condition with the intention of rousing some thought or reaction in the observer. (I do NOT believe in art by accident, but that's a separate point, for the moment). Most of the time, it is an unmade bed. Likewise, in terms of music, I stand firmly in my stance that plagiarism (even accidental plagiarism) can never be art. As such, I think the best case one can make for all the craptastic music out there being considered art in any capacity is the limited artistry in the arrangement of the words (the same words that everyone else already wrote) and their interaction with the music/chords. As you have pointed out, "all things of a kind" may be compared along the metrics defining that kind. And so, I consider the artistic value of this form of music about on par with the artistry employed by me in spicing the meat for my supper on a given night; the artistry of arranging ingredients in a plausibly palatable manner, according to taste. So, I concede, as you say, that it could be art, but on such a limited scale as to be scarce worth the breath to say so.

The danger in this concession, though, is opening the door to the thinking that it is even on the same scale as "good" music. I don't believe it is, and the comparison alone belittles the worth of music that has actually had some thought and artistic intent invested in it. To come back to "things of a kind," the works of Stravinsky and Michaelangelo are more of a kind, to my mind, than the works of Stravinsky and The White Stripes, despite using a different sensory medium in their expression. We are both once again leaning towards demanding a definition of what art is, however, so that's as far as I'll take that point for the moment.

As for video games, I'm not sure where I sit on the notion that a game can holistically be viewed as a work of art, though I agree both that elements of it (design, animation, etc) can be considered art, and with Jason's position that the "game" part of it (fulfilling objectives) cannot be.

Art as a refinement of presently held notions seems to me to be totally consistent with the production of almost any novel idea. A novel idea must surely refine the viewer's presently held notions, as they now consider something which they have never before considered.
The other side to this (still consistent with my definition there) is that there is no such thing as a novel idea. Anything which appears to be so is in fact built entirely upon previous notions, with perhaps some ties or associations never before conceived. (As an aside, this is one of my favourite things to think about, in terms of defining what a thought actually is; essentially, layers of abstraction built upon and strengthening each other through association). Again, those novel associations force the audience to refine presently held notions. The first time someone came up with the idea of a unicorn, was it novel? They just put a horn on a horse, of course. But anyone afterwards now had refined their ideas about horsey creatures; they could have horns!

By the way, I think you would appreciate a quotation that another friend of mine lifted from some forum somewhere: "The plural of anecdote is not data."